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Tanya J. Monestier,

Foreign Judgments at Common
Law: Rethinking the Enforcement
Rules

England and Canada have adopted divergent approaches to the enforcement of foreign
civil and commercial judgments An English court will only enforce a foreign judgment
where the defendant submitted to the junsdiction of the foreign court, or was present
in the foreign jurisdiction when served with process. This position. while protecting
domestic defendants, is outdated and does little to further the objectives underpinning
judgment enforcement- Canadian courts, by contrast, have been far more liberal than
their English counterparts, enforcing foreign judgments in cases where there is a "real
and substantial connection" between the dispute and the judgment forum. While this
approach fully advances the objectives of judgment enforcement, it leaves Canadian
defendants exposed to the penis and uncertainties of international litigation
An alternative to either of these positions would be to adopt a variant of the "real and
substantial connection" test to govern the issue of foreign judgment recognition at
common law Under this framework, questions of how fair it is to require a domestic
defendant to litigate in a foreign forum would be encapsulated within the jurisdictional
inquiry itself. The judgment court would only be perceived as junsdictionally
competent (and its judgment therefore enforceable) when, considenng the totality
of the circumstances and the additional burdens imposed by international litigation,
it is fair and reasonable to expect the defendant to litigate the claim in the foreign
jurisdiction. This test underscores the fact that enforceability concerns are not the
same domestically as they are internationally, and that a test which is to promote the
freer movement ofjudgments must also encompass minimum fairness safeguards
L'Angleterre et le Canada ont adopt6 des methodes difftrentes pour ce qui est de
I'ex6cution des jugements des tribunaux civils et commerciaux trangers.Un tribunal
anglais executera une decision 6trangdre uniquement si la partie defenderesse
s'en est remise A la competence du tribunal etrangerou 6tait present sur le terntolre
6tranger lorsque les procedures lui ont ete signifiees. Quoique cette position
protdge les parties ddfenderesses anglaises elle est ddsuete et ne permet pas de
poursuivre les objectits sous-jacents a rexecution des decisions des tribunaux. Les
tribunaux canadiens, par contre, sont beaucoup plus liberaux que leurs homologues
existe
britanniques et autonsent l'execution de jugements etrangers dans les cas o& il
un - lien reel et substantiel - entre 'objetde I'actionet le ressort du jugement. Mdme si
cette fagon de faire s'inscrit tout J fait dans les objectifs de I'execution des jugements,
elle laisse les defendeurs canadiens 6 la merci des dangers et des incertitudes des
litiges internationaux.
Une troisieme possibilt serait I'adoption d'une vanante du critere de - lien rdel et
substantiel - pour trancher la question de la reconnaissance des jugements 6trangers
en common law Dans ce cadre d'action, les questions visant A determiner si est
6quitabled'exiger qu'une partie defenderesse nationale se defende devant un tribunal
6trangerseraient enchgss6es dans I'examen mdme de la competence Le tribunal
devant lequel FInstance serait instruite ne serait consider6 comme ayant competence
(et, par consequent, son jugement ne serait executable) que si, compte tenu de
l'ensemble des circonstances et des fardeaux additionnels Imposes par le litige
international, il taitjuste et raisonnable de s'attendre4 ce que la partie dufenderesse
fasse valoir ses arguments dans le ressort 6tranger.Ce critere fait ressortir le fait que
les questions relatives au caract~re exicutotre ne sont pas les m~mes 6 I'interieurdun
pays qu'en droit international, et qu'une formule visant a favonser la liberalisation de
I'ex~cution des jugements doit aussi comporter des normes destinies . assurer un
minimum d'quit.
*
B.A. (York University), LL.B. (Osgoode Hall), LL.M. (Cantab.). The author would like to
sincerely thank Mr. Richard Fentiman, Sir Lawrence Collins, the Honourable Frank lacobucci, and
Professor Joost Blom for their insightful comments and suggestions in the preparation of this article.
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Introduction

The extent of the recognition to be afforded in one country to judgments
pronounced by the courts of another country is one of the most baffling
and delicate problems which arise in Private International Law.
- H.C. Gutteridge, Reciprocity in Regard
to Foreign Judgments (1932)

This comment, made nearly three-quarters of acentury ago by aCambridge
law professor, remains as true today as it was then. England and Canada
haN e adopted disparate approaches to the enforcement of foreign civil and
commercial judgments. English courts have developed common law rules
governing the enforceability of foreign judgments which reveal a guarded
approach to judgments from outside the jurisdiction. In particular, an
English court will only enforce a foreign judgment where the defendant
submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court, or was present in the
foreign jurisdiction when served with an originating process. Canadian
courts, by contrast, have exhibited a far more liberal outlook than their
English counterparts, enforcing foreign judgments in cases where there is

Foreign Judgments at Common Law
a "'real and substantial connection" between the dispute and the judgment
forum. Such positions can be said to represent rather extreme points on
the spectrum of possible rules for the enforcement of foreign judgments. It
may be that a preferable common law enforcement regime lies somewhere
between these poles. To ascertain where on such a continuum thisjudgment
enforcement framework may lie requires exploring the deficiencies in the
rules, the objectives served b- enforcing foreign judgments, the relevant
policy considerations in this area of private international law, and possible
alternative tests.
I. Structure and .%fethodolog"
This article commences with an analysis of the relevant goals and objectives
ofjudgment enforcement. The existing grounds for enforcement in England
and Canada are subsequently described and critiqued. A nuanced "'real and
substantial connection" test, a variant of that currently used in Canada,
is suggested as a possible model to go\ em the enforcement of foreign
judgments in both jurisdictions, though its limitations are acknowledged.
The defences to enforcement are then examined, with the conclusion
that they should be revised to better safeguard the legitimate interests of
domestic defendants.
This article focuses on the common law rules for the recognition and
enforcement' of civil and commercial foreign judgments operating in
personam. In England, the common law rules tend to be overlooked - at
least in the academic commentary - in what appears to be a patchwork
of overlapping enforcement mechanisms, including the Brussels I
Regulation2 and several recognition statutes. That is not to say, however,
that the common law is insignificant. First, the recognition statutes in
England replicate in large part the common law; thus, the common law
retains importance for the purposes of statutory interpretation. Second,
the various statutes governing the enforcement of foreign judgments are
of limited geographical application and the judgments of many foreign
jurisdictions are not within their scope. In particular, English common
law principles continue to govern judgments from the Americas, Africa,

I. Though enforcement and recognition have slightly different connotations (the former generally
refers to the enforcement of a monetary sum; the latter pertains to the recognition of a judgment as res
judicata between the parties), the terms - as they often are - will be used interchangeably throughout
this article.
Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000.
2.
3.
See, in particular, the Administration ofJustice Act, 1920(U.K.), 10& 11 Geo. V.,c. 81 and the
c. 13.
Foreign Judgments (Reciprooal Enforcement) Act, 1933 (U.K.). 23 & 24 Geo. V.,
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Asia and large parts of Eastern Europe and the Middle East.' In Canada,
recognition statutes also exist, but are primarily important in the interpro\ incial context. The common law rules remain highly relevant with
respect to the enforcement of foreign judgments in Canada. 5
A final note: while a N\orld-wide judgments convention, bilateral
treaty initiatives, or legislative solutions offer themselves up as interesting
alternative means of enforcing foreign judgments, their respective merits
and drawbacks are beyond the scope of this article and have not been
canvassed in any detail.
11.itI'
Do Countries Recognize ForeignJudgments?
\,on Mehren and Trautman suggest that the ultimate justification for
enforcing judgments of foreign states is that -if
in our highly complex and
interrelated world each community exhausted every possibility of insisting
on its parochial interests, injustice would result and the normal patterns of
life would be disrupted."" In short, it simply makes sense in our modem
global village to enforce judgments issued by foreign courts.
More specifically, judgment enforcement advances the mutual
interests of economically and commercially interdependent states. Yntema
explains:
In a highly integrated v orld economy, politically organized in a diversity
of more or less autonomous legal s\ stems, the function of conflicts rules
is to select, interpret and apply in each case the particular local law that
\%ill best promote suitable conditions of interstate and international
commerce.
Law and economics theories have been used to illustrate why countries
should enforce foreign judgments. It is thought that the free movement
of goods, services, capital and persons must necessarily be accompanied

4.
A Reed, "A New Model ol Jurisdictional Propriet. forAnglo-American Foreign Judgment
Something Borroved, Something New'?" (2003) 25
Rccognition and Enforcement: Something ()ld.
.o.IL \ Intl. & Comp. L. Rev 243 at204.
5
The particular formulation of common la% enforcement rules adopted in Canada also has
implications for the domestic jurisdiction scene. Sec .htcui c tourcelles (2002), 60 O.R. (3d) 20
(C A )(laying do\N n eight non-c\hausti\ c factors to be considered by a court in determining whether
it pos sse urisdiction over an out-of-pros ince defendant under the "real and substantial" connection
t slI.
,. A.T. son Mchrcn & D.T. Trautman, "Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and A
Suggestcd Approach" 0196M) 81 Harv. L. Re,. 1601 at16113.
I.E Yntema. "The Oblccti\es of Pri\ate International Law" (1957) 35 Can. Bar Rev. 721 at
7
74 1.Though his comments %\crcspecificall\ directed at choice of las\,
they remain equally relevant to
judgment cnlorcement.
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by the free movement of judgments. I According to this view, just as
tariffs and other similar restrictions are contrary to the best interests of the
global trading community, so too are limitations on tile free movement of
judgments. In order to best facilitate international trade and commerce,
judgments must essentially "operate as a form of international currency."'
The critical importance of the free movement of judgments in international
commerce and trade has been recognized b\ the European Union in its
adoption of the Brussels Regulation. Under this regime, Member States
expressly acknowledge their collective interest in the free movement of
judgments which is considered "necessar\ for the sound operation of the
internal market."' 0
Political concerns also factor into the question of \\hy countries
enforce foreign judgments. Specificalk. countries choose to enforce
foreign judgments to demonstrate their respect for foreign processes of
adjudication, and thereby promote a stable international community of
nations. Article 16 of the Recitals to the Brussels Regulation, for instance,
makes it clear that the free flo\\ ofjudgments is reinforced b\ "mutual trust
in the administration ofjustice in the Community."" Outside a multilateral
convention, that trust of foreign legal s\ stems is embodied in a country's
rules on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
Administration of justice issues also tend to figure prominently in the
analysis of why countries enforce foreign judgments. From a basic
institutional efficiency point of \ie\\. it is highly inconvenient to relitigate a dispute mhen it has already been fairly adjudicated by a
foreign court of competent jurisdiction. To permit a retrial under such
circumstances would encourage a wasteful multiplicity of litigation and
a squandering of judicial resources. \1oreo\er. it is unfair to require a
judgment creditor to re-litigate a dispute in a domestic forum once he
or she has alread\ successfully brought the claim abroad. Particularly
when ajudgment creditor has brought an action in an entirely appropriate
foreign forum, it is difficult tojustif, wh. the judgment debtor should be
"
permitted a "'second kick at the can" in domestic proceedings.
exchanges occur e\en where legal nghts are not easily
8.
Brand argues that "in today's world ...
enforced. At the same time, hose,.er, the lack of a system of rights enforcement or any limitation on
enforcement raises transaction costs related to those exchanges, The higher costs of operating in such
an environment result in higher pnces necessary to maintain the same profit margin, thus causing a
reduction in the number of exchanges that \ ill occur. Thefaure to enforce legal rights, including
those reduced tojudgment in otherjursdictions thus repre.ents a significant trade barrier (emphasis
added)." R.A. Brand, "Recognition of Foreign Judgments as a Trade Law Issue: The Economics of
Private International Law" in J.S. Bhandari et al.. eds., Economic Dimensions in International Law
(New York: Cambridge University Prc,, 1997) at 613.
9. J. Hill, Law Relating to International Commercial Disputes, 2nd ed. (London 1998) at 337.
10. Brussels I Regulation, supra note 2, Recital I.
I. Brussels I Regulation, supra note 2, Recital 16.
12. Or conversely, why the unsuccessful plaintiff in the foreign proceedings should be able to relitigate the claim in a domestic forum.
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Ill. The Common Law Rules: Ovetview

1.England
At common law, a judgment is considered prima facie enforceable if
it satisfies the following criteria: a) the judgment is for a fixed sum 3 ;
b) the judgment is final' 4 ; c) the judgment would not amount to the
enforcement of foreign public law."S The more problematic aspect of
judgment enforcement stems from the requirement that the foreign court
must possess jurisdiction over the defendant according to English rules
of private international law. 6 It is now well-established that an English
court regards a foreign court as jurisdictionally competent either where
the defendant was present in the territory at the time of service of the
originating process, or where the defendant submitted to the jurisdiction 7
of the foreign court. Apart from "'presence" and "submission," it is
thought that no other basis of jurisdiction will suffice to render a foreign
court competent in the international sense, such that its judgment will be
enforced in England. 8

13. Beattv c Beatn, I1124] I K.B. 807 (C.A.) ("No doubt a judgment to be final must be for a
sum certain. But a sum is sufficiently certain for that purpose if it can be ascertained by a simple
arithmetical process.").
14. For ajudgment to be considered final, it must be final and unalterable in the court that pronounced
it..\ judgment may be regarded as final even if it is subject to appeal. See Colt Industries v Sarlie
(,\o 2j,[1966] 1 W.LR. 1287. If an appeal is pending, the court called upon to enforce the judgment
ma c\ercise its discretion to grant a stay of the enforcement proceedings pending the appeal.
15. See e.g United States v InkIr" 11989] Q.B. 255 (C.A.) (where the English court would not
enforce a Flonda judgment where the purpose was the execution of a penal process). However, the
foreign judgment will be denied enforcement only if it falls directly within the area of revenue, penal
or other public laws strictly construed.
16. Sirdar Gurd'.al Singh v The Rajah of Faridkote,[ 1874] A.C. 670 (P.C.).
17. Briggs asserts that agreement by submission is "more puzzling than is currently acknowledged"
and questions whether it follows that because a defendant has agreed to the adjudicatory jurisdiction
of a certain court, the defendant necessarily agreed to accept the international enforcement of any
judgment rendered against him. See A. Briggs, "Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones: Rethinking
the Law on Foreign Judgments" (211041 8 Singapore Y.B.I.L. I at 9 [Briggs, "Crossing the River"].
IX
Bases of jurisdiction not regarded as sufficient to found jurisdiction for enforcement purposes
include: presence of the defendant in the foreign jurisdiction at the time the cause of action arose;
nationality, domicile; possession of property in the Ioreign jurisdiction; assumption ofjurisdiction by
the foreign court based on the equivalent of England's service out rules.
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2.Canada
Prior to 1990, the rules for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments in common la'w Canada" closely paralleled those of England.
As a pre-requisite to recognition, the enforcing province must have
regarded the foreign court as jurisdictionally competent, either because
the defendant was present in the territory or the defendant submitted to the
jurisdiction of the foreign court. At that time, all jurisdictions external to
the provincial forum, domestic or international, were regarded as equally
foreign. This meant that for the purposes of private international law, a
judgment from Alberta was considered "foreign" to an Ontario court in the
same way that a Polish or Kenyan judgment would be.
In 1990, the case of Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savove2"
fundamentally altered the landscape of judgment enforcement in Canada.
The Supreme Court of Canada, in what has been hailed as 'the most
important [Canadian] decision on the conflict of laws," 2' held that a
default judgment from Alberta was enforceable against a defendant in
British Columbia, even though the defendant had neither consented to the
as he served with process there.
jurisdiction of the Alberta courts, nor N%
La Forest J., writing for a unanimous court, reasoned that -[i]f it is fair
and reasonable for the courts of one province to exercise jurisdiction over
a subject matter, it should as a general principle be reasonable for the
courts of another province to enforce the resultant judgment."" Otherwise
stated:
[T]he courts in one province should give full faith and credit, to use the
language of the United States Constitution, to the judgments given by a
court in another province or a territory, so long as that court has properly,
or appropriately, exercised jurisdiction in the action.23
19. The rules governing the enforcement of foreign judgments in Quebec. codified in Book Ten
of the Civil Code, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, differ significantly from those described in this article. For a
discussion of the Quibec rules, see G. Saumier, "The Recognition of Foreign Judgments in Quebec
-The Mirror Crack'd?" (2002) 81 Can. Bar Rex. 677: J. Goodman & J. Talpis, "Beals i: Saldanha
and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Canada" (2004) 40 Can. Bus. L. J. 227 at 238-244.
Note also that two provinces. New Brunswick and Saskatchew an. have legislation governing the
enforcement of foreign judgments that preserves the English common law rules: Foreign Judgments
Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. F-19; Foreign Judgments Aci, R.S.S. 1987, c. F-18. It wvould appear that the
discussion of both the English and the Canadian rules is particularly instructive in these provinces, as
they have yet to confront the challenge of modernizing their foreign judgment enforcement regimes.
20. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 [Morguard].
21. See J. Ziegel, "Introduction, Symposium: Recognition of Extraprovincial and Foreign Judgments:
The Implications of Morguard Investments Ltd it De Savoye" (1993) 22 Can. Bus. L. J. I at 2. Blom
comments that "no other system of private international law has experienced ajudicial re-invention of
its foundations that was so rapid." J. Blom "Reform of Private International Law by Judges: Canada
as a Case Study" in J. Fawcett, ed., Reform & Development of Private InternationalLaw: Essays in
Honour ofSir Peter North (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 31.
22, Morguard, supra note 20 at 1094.
23. Morguard, supra note 20 at 1102.
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A court properly or appropriately assumes jurisdiction where there is
a sufficiently close nexus - or in the language of Morguard,a "real and
substantial connection" - between the dispute and the provincial forum.24
In Beals v Saldanha, 5 the Supreme Court confirmed that the real and
substantial connection test was intended to replace the traditional indicia
of jurisdiction (presence and submission) in determining the jurisdictional
competence of the foreign court."'
The Supreme Court of Canada expressed concern in Morguard
about the way that Canadian provinces had unquestioningly transposed
the English rules, which had been designed to deal with "truly foreign"
judgments, to judgments rendered by sister provinces. La Forest J.
correctly remarked that these rules were particularly ill-suited to a federal
state and "fl[ew] in the face of the obvious intention of the Constitution
to create a single country."'" Morguardclearly mandated a change in the
rules of private international law as between sister provinces. 21 What was
less clear was whether Alorguard actually intended to alter the approach
of Canadian courts to the recognition and enforcement of "truly foreign"
judgments. Shortly after the .loiguard decision was handed down,
lower courts seized on La Forest J.'s dicta about the need to facilitate and
24. Until Beals v Saldanha, 12003] S.CJ. No. 77, it Nas unclear whether .1lorguard and its progeny
required a real and substantial connection bet, een the defendant and the forum, or the subject-matter
ofthe dispute and the forum. In Beals, it was clarified at para. 23 that "[a] substantial connection with
the subject matter of the action N%
ill satisfy the real and substantial connection test even in the absence
of such a connection mith the defendant to the action." The case did not shed much light on the types
of connections that would suffice to support jurisdiction. In Hunt v T & N pie., [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289
at 326 [Hunt], the Supreme Court of Canada eschewed a rigid test which focused on "a mechanical
counting of contacts or connections" and preferred that the jurisdictional inquiry be guided by broad
requirements of order and fairness. Critics argue that the real and substantial connection jurisdictional
test sulfers at the outset from inherent uncertainty and unpredictability, both of which are significantly
magnified on an international scale.
25 [2003] S.C.J. No. 77, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416 (Beals cited to S.C.J.].
26 It is open to interpretation whether the Supreme Court intended to replace the traditional bases of
jurisdiction with the "real and substantial" test. Mlajor J. stated at para. 37 that "[a] real and substantial
connection is the o%erriding factor in the determination of jurisdiction. The presence of more of the
traditional indicia of jurisdiction (attornment, agreement to submit, residence and presence in the
foreign jurisdiction) will serv e to bolster the real and substantial connection to the action or parties."
Thi , would strongly suggest that the real and substantial connection test has now subsumed the
traditional grounds ofjurisdiction. Howevcr. Major J. proceeded to state, "[ajlthough such a connection
is an important factor, parties to an action continue to be free to select or accept the jurisdiction in
which their dispute is to be resolved by attorning or agreeing to the jurisdiction of a foreign court."
Pitel argues that "the first two sentences of this quotation look like an unwelcome attempt to collapse
ccrything down to the real and substantial connection test, with the traditional bases reduced to
factors" but maintains that "without clearer language, the court should not be understood to have
eliminated some or all of the traditional bases for jurisdiction." S. Pitel, "Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments: Where IhnoguardStands After Beals" (2004) 40 Can. Bus. L. J. 189 at 202-03.
27. .h1nmpard, supra note 20 at 1079.
28. In hnt, supra note 24 at 324 the Supreme Court of Canada placed this new approach on a
constitutional footing and confirmed that the Morguard rules are "constitutional imperatives."
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accommodate the flow of wealth across state lines, and began applying the
real and substantial connection test to foreign judgments (in particular, to
judgments from the United States and England). The Supreme Court of
Canada recently declared in Beals that this was the correct interpretation
of the Aloituard decision and that the real and substantial connection test
does indeed apply to truly foreign judgments.
IV. Defences to Etlorcement
Since the common law rules for the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments operate in tandem with various defences - public
policy, natural justice and fraud - it is imperative to consider the rules
in conjunction with the defences in order to gain an accurate picture of
judgment enforcement.
1. Public Policy

In both England and Canada, ajudgment will not be recognized or enforced
domestically where to do so would be contrarN to the forum's conception
of basic morality. Justice Cardozo's eloquent articulation of the public
policy defence bears repeating:
We are not so prosvincial as to say that e\er\ solution of a problem is
wrong because %e deal \Nith it other%%ise at home ...
The courts are not
free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the pleasure of the judges, to
suit the individual notion of expediency or fairness. They do not close
their doors unless help \ould \iolate some fundamental principle of
justice, some pre\alent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted
tradition of the common weal. 29

The defence of public policy has been interpreted narrowly and has
only been successfully invoked under quite exceptional circumstances?
In Beals, Major J. for the majority expressed concern about ascribing a
wide meaning to public policy:
29. Loucks v StandardOilCo ofNew );rk, 22 N Y. 99 at 111 (191,1. Though thejudgment is an
American one, the same vies of public policy is taken in England and Canada.
30. See, for instance, leraeke v Smith, [19831 I A.C. 145 (H.L.) (House of Lords refusing to
recognize a Belgian decree of nullity invalidating a sham marriage based on the same reasons that it
had declined to invalidate the marriage at first instance, namely that the parties
had used the marriage
as a vehicle for confemng British nationality on the alien partner to ,a\
c her from deportation after
conviction fbra criminal offence.); Re Macarnev [192111 Ch. 522 (English court denying enforcement
of a Maltese judgment awarding a mother perpetual maintenance on behalf of an illegitimate child
against the estate of the deceased putative father. The court Nsas of the vic% that it was counter to
public policy to enforce an affiliation order that was not limited to minority.); Israel Discnun Bank
v. Hladjipoteras.[1984] 1 W.LR. 137 (C.A.) (Court of Appeal suggesting that it might be contrary to
English public policy to enforce ajudgment that was based on a contract which had been procured as a
result of undue influence, Note, however, that this case has been criticized on the basis that it must be
the recognition or enforcement that is contrary to public policy, and not the underlying contract upon
which the enforcement proceeding is based.).

172

The Dalhousie Law Journal
The use of the defence of public policy to challenge the enforcement of a
foreignjudgment involves impeachment of thatjudgment by condemning
the foreign law on which the judgment is based. It is not a remedy to be
used lightly. The expansion of this defence to include perceived injustices
that do not offend our sense of morality is unwarranted. The defence of
public policy should continue to have narrow application."

Arguably the most important decision with respect to public policy in
the commercial context is S,4 Consortium General Textiles v. Sun & Sand
.Agencies where Lord Denning emphasized:
[There is] nothing contrary to English public policy in enforcing a claim
for exemplary damages, which is still considered to be in accord with the
public policy in the United States and many of the great countries of the
Commonwealth. "
The question of whether foreign punitive damages awards should be
enforced domestically is the subject of much debate and will likely remain
fertile ground for discussion given concerns over large punitive awards
characteristic of certain jurisdictions, notably the United States.
2. Natural Justice
A foreign judgment will not be enforced in England or Canada if its
enforcement would result in the denial of natural justice to the defendant.
In Adams v. Cape Industries,3 the English Court ofAppeal held that natural
justice was not confined to its two traditional requirements - "notice" and
-opportunity to be heard" - but extended to situations involving procedural
defects leading to a "breach of the English court's views of substantial
justice."-34 The Court of Appeal in .dams saw the method of assessment of
damages by a federal district court judge in Texas as a violation of natural
justice, since it involved the judge arriving at a lump sum award (on
suggestion of plaintiff's counsel) to be distributed in amounts which were
not based on proof of injuries suffered by any of the individual plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court of Canada in Beals followed the Adams approach
to natural justice, noting that a party seeking to impugn a foreign judgment
must prove that the foreign proceedings were contrary to Canadian notions

31. Beals, iupra note 25 at para. 75.
32 [1978] Q.B. 279 at 300. Canada has followed this decision, such that high punitive damages
awards per w do not %iolate public policy.
33.

[19901(h 433((.A,)[Adams].

34 Ibid. at 564, The idea of-substantial justice" Nas first referred to in this context in Pemberton v.
Hughes. ( 18991 I Ch. 781 at 790 (C.A.), %
here Lord Lindlev observed, "[i]fajudgment is pronounced
by a foreign court o%er persons within its jurisdiction and in a matter with which it is competent to
deal, English courts never investigate the propriety of the proceedings in the foreign Court, unless
they offend against English views of substantial justice."
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of "fundamental justice" ".or "minimum Canadian standards of fairness.""
It appears that both jurisdictions are purporting to take a broader view
of natural justice than that traditionall expounded in the jurisprudence. 7
The limits of the defence of natural justice vill need to be explored in
future case law for its contours to be known.
3. Fraud
While the defences of public policy and natural justice are treated in a
similar manner in Canada and England, the defence of fraud is approached
quite differently. Inthe leading English case on fraud in foreign judgments,
.4bouloff v Oppenheimer," Lord Coleridge C.J. and Brett L.J. held that
whether a foreign court had been deliberately misled was not, and never
could be, an issue upon which the foreign court could pass judgment. Thus,
to re-open the judgment in subsequent English enforcement proceedings
was not to revisit the merits of a judgment pronounced by a foreign
court. Consequently, a foreign judgment may be impeached in an English
enforcement proceeding in the absence of ne,.ly discovered evidence and
in circumstances where the fraud could haN e been, and was, alleged in
the foreign proceedings. In Sval : Hevward 5 for instance, the Court of
Appeal held that it was irrelevant that the unsuccessful party in the foreign
proceedings deliberately refrained from raising the fraud defence in the
original trial, even though all the material facts were known to him at the
time. This view, as contro\ersial as it has proven," has been confirmed
4
repeatedly in the case la-,v.
Canada's approach to the fraud defence is considerably less liberal
than that of the English courts. Canadian courts will allow evidence of
fraud to be adduced before the enforcing court only in circumstances where
such evidence could not have been previously discovered and brought

35. Beals, supra note 25 at para. 59.
36. Beals, supra note 25 at para. 63.
ies of natural
37. It is open to debate w.hether the majority in Beals actually applied a broader %
ere not confined to notice
justice. Although the majority said that the requirements of natural justice %%
and opportunity to be heard, its analysis of the Florida proceedings was in essence limited to these two
elements. See Beals, supra at para. 69: '1 am of the opinion that the appellants were fully informed
ere ad%ised of the case to meet and were granted a fair opportunity to
about the Florida action. They %%
do so."
38. (1882)10Q.B.D. 295 (C.A.) [4bouloff].
39. [1948] 2 K.B. 443 (C.A.).
40. See discussion below.
41. See Vadala %Lawes (1890), 25 Q.B.D. 310 (C.A.) (e%idence presented to the English court to
establish the fraud claim was the same as that rejected by the foreign court); Jet Holdings Inc. v.Patel,
(1990] 1Q.B. 335 (C.A.) (Court of Appeal emphasized that a foreign court's views on whether a fraud
had been committed against the court were neither conclusive nor relevant); Owens Bank v. Bracco,
(1992] 2 A.C. 443 (H.L.) [Owens Bank] (House of Lords affirmed the common law rule setout in
Abouloff, although it expressed some reservations about its continued application).
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to the attention of the foreign court through the exercise of reasonable
diligence. In Beals, the Supreme Court of Canada indicated that this view
appropriately balanced the need to guard against fraudulently procured
judgments with the need to preserve finality in judgments.
V. Problems l 7ith The Common Law Enforcement Rules
1. The Common Lam Rules in England: 196 Century Rules, 211 Century
Problems
The common law rules for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments in England have remained virtually unchanged since the 191,
century. It is no wonder that the rules have been described as "outmoded," ' 2
"'antediluvian,"4 3 and "parochial." '
One commentator has remarked
that "It]he point recognized in Morguard is that what was appropriate
for nineteenth century England is not appropriate for late twentieth
century interprovincial Canadian judgments. But it is obvious that it is
not appropriate for contemporary England either."45 While the current
rules boast the advantages of certainty and predictability for the English
defendant, they are hostile to most of the purported goals of judgment
recognition discussed above: facilitating commercial trade, promoting
political goodwill and international order, preserving institutional resources
by avoiding re-litigation of disputes, and ensuring fairness to both parties
to the litigation.
In addition to running counter to the objectives of judgment
enforcement, the rules are not consistent with other aspects of English
pri\ate international law. Any astute student of the conflict of laws will
recognize the incongruity between the jurisdictional rules related to the
assertion of in personam jurisdiction and those for the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. This may be because the jurisdictional
rules have historically been analyzed quite independently of the rules on
the enforcement of judgments. Briggs observes that "conflicts lawyers
have grown up to see these as two separate and distinct branches of the
law, with little in common but much between them: the 'in between part'
being the rules on choice of law." The obvious peril of separating rules on

42. J, S\an & V. Black, "New Rules for the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Morguard
Investments Ltd. v. De Saoye" (1991) 12 Ad\ocates' Q. 481 at 494,
43. Reed, 'mpr noto 4 at 271.
44
1I.oguard, supranote 20 at 1098.
45. J. Harris. "Recognition of Foreign Judgments at Common Law - The Anti-Suit Injunction Link"
(1997)p70().J.L.S. 477at4X2.
40. A. Briggs, -Which Foreign Judgments Should We Recognise Today?" (1987) 36 I.C.L.Q. 240 at
240 [Briggs, "Which Foreign Judgments"].
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jurisdiction and enforcement is that -legal thought develops independently
in one branch, though the two branches are inherently collinear.""
At an intuitive level, it appears anomalous that an English court would
assume jurisdiction over a defendant not present in the territory under its
service exjuris rules where, for instance, a tort was committed in England,
but that an English court would not enforce a judgment issued by a foreign
state when that foreign state asserted jurisdiction on an identical basis. 4
Why, in other words, should there be a marked distinction between
two categories of jurisdiction: one for the assumption of in pt'rsonam
jurisdiction by English courts, and the other for recognizing and enforcing
foreign judgments'? When an English court claims jurisdiction over a
defendant not present in the country under its long-arm jurisdictional rules
embodied in Civil Procedure Rule 6.20." it does so because there exists
a requisite minimal connection which makes it justifiable and fair for an
English court to adjudicate the dispute. When a foreign court proceeds
according to similar principles, is it not equally fair that English courts
regard that foreign tribunal as jurisdictionally competent for the purposes
we recognize a
ofjudgment enforcement? In the "vords of one author, "if
one
jurisdiction,
to
take
court
an
English
for
particular basis as sufficient
might conclude that a foreign court's judgment given in circumstances
where wve would have thought ourselves jurisdictionally competent ought
to be recognized here." 5"
Another element of the misalignment betwveen the in personam
jurisdiction rules and those for the recognition of foreign judgments stems
from the fact that the former are conditioned by the doctrine offorum non
conveniens, such that jurisdiction will not be assumed by an English court
where there is clearly a more appropriate forum somewhere else. The
forum non conveniens principle is designed to guard, inter alia, against
the potentially unfair and arbitrary consequences that may arise from
a defendant's temporary presence within a territory. When an English
court possesses jurisdiction simpliciter solely by virtue of the defendant's
transitory presence within the jurisdiction. it is likely to decline to
exercise this jurisdiction under the principle offorum non conveniens. In
the judgment enforcement inquiry, however, presence of the defendant
in the territory is one of the two traditional jurisdictional bases upon
47. Reed, supra note 4 at 252.
48. This should not be taken a. suggesting a strict reciprocity ofjurisdiction approach - i.e.. Country
A should recognize the judgment of Country B where Country B assumed jurisdiction on a basis
which Country A claims for itself. See generally .forguard, rejecting an approach which premises
enforcement on reciprocity ofjurisdiction.
49, Allowing service of process on absent defendants.
50. Harris, supra note 45 at 478.
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which judgments are enforced. The enforcing court is not empowered
to examine the nature of the defendant's presence in the territory and the
foreign judgment is prima facie enforceable. This is true notwithstanding
the fact that the English court would have declined to exercise jurisdiction
over the dispute under similar conditions. "' In the words of one English
commentator:
It is as though those vivid principles [offorui non conveniens] which

have revolutionized the jurisdiction of courts in common law countries
... have no bearing whatever on the receiving court's assessment of
whether a foreign court had international jurisdiction to adjudicate. In
this respect. the traditional common law is surely open to sustained
question.Another problematic aspect of England's recognition practices concerns
the chasm that exists between the strict common law rules, on the one hand,
and the considerably more liberal Brussels Regulation rules, on the other.
The Brussels Regulation, which applies to Member States of the European
Union, is a highly structured regime which predicates its almost automatic
enforcement rules on common and well-defined jurisdictional grounds.
This fundamental dichotomy between the enforcement of judgments at
common law and under the Brussels Regulation is a significant one for
litigants in international disputes. In particular, it provides a clear incentive
for forum shopping. A claimant is encouraged to initiate proceedings in the
courts of a Member State, so that recognition will follow inexorably in
England. This is tactically preferable to pursuing a dispute in what may
be a more appropriate non-EU forum and assuming the consequent risk of
non-en torcement.
Morcover, the degree of respect accorded to judgments of Member
States compared \v ith that accorded to judgments of non-Member States at
common law is unjustifiable. Although the Brussels Regulation provides
a detailed legal framework, specifically designed to ensure that justice is
51, Sec C \W Fa's4,erg, "Rule and Reason in the Common LaN% of Foreign Judgments" 12 (1999)
Can. J. L. & Juris 193 at 1)1(-99 ("...it is sutficient for the enforcement of a foreignjudgment that the
defendant %%as present in the country issuing the judgment only fleetingly on the day on which he was
,ummoncd It)court, c\ en though that countr, had no connection to either of the parties or to the event
producing litigation. But it is not sufficient that the cause of action arose in the foreign country which
wAaalso the plaintiff's country of residence These two situations are odd enough in themselves. They
arc vesn oddcr when it is remembered that English courts, the courts which formulated these rules,
would dceline jurisdiction in the first case - where the foreign judgment \Nould be enforced - and
would take jurisdiction in the second - where the foreign judgment would not be enforced."). See
also P North & J.1.IUawcett, eds., Chcur and North. Private International Law, 131ed. (London:
Butterw,,rth,. 1999), 4(1) ("an analogy based on the jurisdiction of the English courts is not particularly
con incing, since the rules are operated in conjunction \%ith a discretion to stay the proceedings and
that exercise is likely to he an issue when jurisdiction is founded on mere presence").
52. See Briggs, "Crossing the River," siipro note 17 at II.
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properly handed out by Member States. this does not mean that countries
outside the regime are not similarl\ capable of dispensing justice. One
author comments in this regard, "since %Necan hardly assume that all noncontracting States are incapable of handing out justice, the disparity in
'3
recognition appears unsatisfactory."
Frustration Nvith the common law enforcement rules is further
exacerbated by the English courts' generous approach to the fraud defence,
which is said to drive "a coach and horses through the policy favouring
conclusiveness of foreign judgments and finality of litigation.""4 Collier
notes that the fraud rule is "universally condemned" by academics" and
lacks a real foundation:
The Court of Appeal applied [the fraud rule] once more in Owen.s Bank
indeed
Ltd. %. Bracco in 1991, but ga\e no convincing reason for it;
it found part of the reasoning in Abouloff quite uncon\ incing. Now
the House of Lords has in that case unfortunately refused to Let rid of
.Abouloff so an unjustifiable and chauN inistic rule continues to disfigure
the law."
The inadequacy of the Aboult/of rule, a rule which vests courts with a
broad power to revisit disputes on their merits, is also evidenced by the
fact that English courts often seek to circumvent the strictures (or, more
accurately, lack thereof) of the rule. In particular, courts have attempted
" and by using the court's
to evade the fraud rule both by distinguishing it
inherent power to prevent misuse of its process."
England's restrictive enforcement rules. coupled with its overly
broad interpretation of the fraud defence. do little to promote the goals
which lie at the heart of judgment enforcement. The rules interfere with
international commercial transactions, engender a x\asteful multiplicity of
litigation, punish litigants \ ho choose to pursue their remedy in an entirely
appropriate forum, and imply distrust or suspicion of foreign legal systems.
The common law enforcement rules were conceived in an era where

53. Harris. supra note 45 at 482
54. Reed, supra note 43 at 2Yti
55. But see A. Briggs, "Foreign Judgments: More Surprises" (191)2) I08L.Q.R. 549, where he posits
that the result in 01 ens Bank was "entirely satisfactor'."
56. J.G. Collier. "Fraud Still Unravels Foreign Judgments" (1992) 51 CL.J. 441 at 442 (citations
omitted).
57. See House of Spring Gardens Lid. v ii ini [1991] I Q.B. 241 (C.A.). The fact that the issue
of fraud had already been litigated in Ireland in a ,,ccond action (scparate from the primary litigation
upon which the judgment was based) estopped the defendants from alleging at the enforcement stage
that the prior English judgment had been fraudulently obtained.
58. See Owens Bank v Etoile Comerciale. [1995] 1 W.L.R. 44 (P.C.), where the Privy Council
struck out a bank's attempt to plead fraud as an abuse of process because it had already been pleaded
in a French court.
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they may have been quite suitable to the conditions of the day - where,
for instance, travel was difficult, nation states operated as completely
independent, sovereign units, and trade was primarily domestic rather than
international. The world has changed a great deal since nineteenth-century
England. Commerce and litigation are now transnational phenomena, and
we accurately speak of a global trading community. Litigants can and
should be expected to travel to the most appropriate forum for the resolution
of their dispute, provided that fairness concerns are adequately addressed.
As a gcneral rule, foreign legal systems are capable of dispensing justice
and warrant respect and deference. Indeed, "inthe twenty-first century
the number of countries in which litigation may 'belong' but in whose
courts the quality of thejudicial process would make us uneasy is small." 9
England's common law rules, in short, are hopelessly anachronistic and
wholly out-of-step with modem commercial, economic and political
realities.
2. The Common Law Rules in Canada: Too Far Too Fast
Canadian courts should be commended for modifying the common law
rules to better integrate jurisdiction and enforcement, such that the two are
regarded as flip sides of the same coin. The question at the jurisdiction
stage of the inquiry is identical to that at the enforcement stage: does the
court have a sufficiently real and substantial connection with the subjectmatter of the dispute to justify the assumption of jurisdiction? If the
answer is "'yes," then the jurisdictional competence of the court has been
established.
In Akhltguard and Beals, the rules for the enforcement of foreign
judgments were examined under a distinctively commercial light. In the
oft-quoted words of La Forest J. in Morguard:
The business community operates in a world economy and we correctly
speak of a world community even in the face of decentralized political
and legal power. Accommodating the flow of wealth, skills and people
across state lines has now become imperative. Under these circumstances,
our approach to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
would appear ripe for reappraisal.'
In Becals, the Supreme Court restructured the common law rules relating
to truly foreign judgments with a view to promoting international business
relations, facilitating cross-border transactions and assisting foreign

59. Reed, ,upra note 4 at 272, quoting J.D. McLean & K.W. Patchett, The Recognition and
Proces mthin the Commonwealth, art. 263
Enforcement ofJudgmron and Orders and the Serce otf
(London: Commonwealth Secretariat. 1978)..
60. A uMard, supra note 20 at I(U98.
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judgment creditors to obtain an effective remedy against defendants
resident in Canada. The ne%% rules reflect the needs of modern commerce
and fully advance the Narious objectives of judgment enforcement.
However, in their fervour to modernize private international law,
Canadian courts may have overshot the mark. Just as the Canadian
courts "'unthinkingly" transposed the English rules for the enforcement
of truly foreign judgments to those issued by Canadian sister provinces,
so too the majority in Beals may have unthinkingly extended the
.I orguard real and substantial connection test for the enforcement of
domestic judgments to judgments issued by foreign courts. In Beals,
Major J. admitted that the enforcement of foreign judgments could raise
"'different issues"' and "diffierent considerations" " than the enforcement
of domestic judgments, drawing on the dicta of La Forest J. in Morguard
indicating that greater caution should be exercised in relation to "truly
foreign" judgments. Nonetheless, Major J. proceeded to broaden the
Morguard test, unequivocally and without qualification, to judgments
issued by foreign countries. He concluded that there was "no principled
reason" why foreign judgments should not be treated in the same way as
judgments issued by sister provinces, provided of course that the court
assumed jurisdiction on the basis of a real and substantial connection
with the dispute."' Major J. extended the Morguard test to international
judgments in the name of comity, specifically reasoning that "the need to
accommodate the flow of wealth, skills and people across state lines is as
much an imperative internationally as it is interprovincially."""
With respect, the Supreme Court's uncritical extension of the
Morguard rules to the international context fails to appreciate that
domestic enforcement imperatives differ appreciably from international
ones. LeBel J., in his powerful dissenting opinion in Beals, underscored
61.

.tlorzgrd.supra note 20 at 1095.

62. Beals, supra note 25 at para. 26.
63. Beals, supra note 25 at para. 2R.
64. Note the comment of Non Mchren and Trautman. supra note 6 at 1607 that "we cannot
automatically deri'e solutions for international practice from decisions respecting recognition of
judgments of sister states." This is exactly %hat appears to ha\c been done in Beals.
65. Beals, supra note 25 at para. 19. To his credit. Major J.does say at para. [30] that "any unfairness
that may arise as a result of the broadened application of [the real and substantial connection] test
[should] be taken into account." How ever, the majorit-, judgment, unlike that of the dissent, does not
explore how an application of the Morguardtest to international judgments could result in unfairness,
and the ways that this could be remedied. See Parsons v McDonalds Restaurants of Canada
[2004] OJ. No. 83 at para. 37 ("The reasoning of the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Beals is not explicit on the nature of any modifications that may be required in applying Morguard
internationally.").
66. Beals. supra note 25 at para. 26. Major J. appears not to acknowledge La Forest J.'s statement in
Morguard, supra note 20 at 1098 that "[tihe considerations underlying the rules of comity apply with
much greaterforce between the units of a federal state..." (emphasis added).
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the fact that "the considerations informing the application of the test to
foreign-country judgments are not identical to those that shape conflict
rules within Canada."
Indeed, it must be recalled that in Morguard,La
Forest J. grounded his analysis in uniquely Canadian realities. Although he
spoke of international comity, the decision was principally underpinned by
federalism concerns and the inappropriateness of a disjointed enforcement
regime between provinces. The tenor of La Forest J.'s reasoning indicated
that it was simply illogical to treat the constituent units of a federation - a
concept which implies social, economic and political integration-as foreign
jurisdictions for the purposes of judgment enforcement. This federalism
stream of reasoning permeating the Moiguard decision obviously has no
application in the international judgment enforcement arena.
The Court in Morguardalso made reference to the fact that concerns
about the quality of justice in the inter-provincial sphere could have "no
real foundation" and that "fair process is not an issue within the Canadian
federation." ' We cannot make the same presumptions in the international
context. To date, most of the foreign judgments that Canadian courts have
been called upon to enforce using the Morguardanalysis have been issued
by American and English courts. If "foreign" is conceived in terms of
these jurisdictions (and possibly a few others) the extension of Morguard
principles to foreign judgments would likely cause little trepidation.
However, at the risk of pointing out the obvious, foreign means foreign the test, in theory, would apply equally and indiscriminately to judgments
from the U.S., Ghana, Uzbekistan, Romania and Burkina Faso. Ivankovich
argues in this respect:
Canadian courts are unable to make the same assumptions about
procedural and substantive fairness and the quality of justice in the
international context that they are able to make domestically. Postoiguard,the issue has received only cursory attention to date because
the international judgments for which recognition was sought were
from the United States and the United Kingdom, jurisdictions with legal
systems similar to Canada's ...
If Morguard'srecognition rule continues

to be extended to international judgments, the day will soon come
when Canadian courts will have to address fairness issues arising out
of judgments rendered by courts with systems of justice substantially

67
6N

BeaA supra note 25 at para. 166.
Aorgi'ral supra note 2o at pp. I100, 1103,
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different from that prevailing in the local forum. 6

The expanded Morguard test does nothing - besides assert that the old
common law defences continue to apply - to address the critical difference
in fairness concerns between the domestic and international context.
Aside from the issue of how fair the foreign legal system may be, the
real and substantial connection test ignores the question of how fair it is to
require a Canadian defendant to litigate in a foreign forum. " Presumably
the extended MoTiguard test operates thus: if certain facts amount to a
real and substantial connection with Country A. they must also amount
to an equally real and substantial connection with Country B or Country
C. If we say, then, that ownership of property in Ne%\ York grounds New
York courts' jurisdiction under the real and substantial connection test,
logic dictates that ownership of property in Nepal w\ill similarly support
Nepalese courts' jurisdiction. Once a real and substantial connection with
either New York or Nepal has been made out, a Canadian defendant is
expected to defend his claim in the foreign jurisdiction - irrespective of
where that jurisdiction is, how difficult it is to access, and how unfamiliar
the legal terrain may be - or risk the possibility that an enforceable default
judgment will be issued against him.
The status of the law post-Beals is that essentially no protection is
provided to domestic defendants. "' This %vaslikely the unintended effect
69. I.F. Ivankovich. "Enforcing U.S. Judgments in Canada: 'Things Are Looking Up"" 0445) 15
N\ J. Intl. L. & Bus. 491 at 51 . Similarl\. Finkle. Coakeley and Bamngton observe that the extension
of Morguard principles "max be appropriate, and even practical, insofar as American judgments
are concerned, because they emanate from a legal system which is similar to our own. HoCe\er,
Canadian judges will eventually face more difficult decisions when asked to recognize judgments
from other Ibreign states %shere principles ofju.,tice. court procedures and judicial protections are less
similar to ours." See S. Coakeley, P. Finkle & L. Barrington, "MorguardInvestments Ltd.: Emerging
International Implications" (1992) 15 Dal. L. J. 629 at 640.
70. It might be argued that faimcs" to the defendant is encapsulated within the real and substantial
connection inquiry. Under this %ie., w here the foreign court properly assumed jurisdiction under
Morguardprinciples,how can we saN that it is not fair for the defendant to be required to litigate there?
Indeed, the purpose ofadopting the real and substantial connection test over the pre%ious jurisdictional
bases (submission and presence) w as to ensure that the assumption ofjurisdiction over the defendant
was fair by reference to a minimum number of connections w ith the issuing forum. Any issue of
unfairness or hardship arising from individual circumstances can be addressed by invoking the foreign
court's mechanisms to provide relief(e.g., claiming. %here applicable, that the foreign court is not the
forum conveniens).
71.
See, for instance, LeBel J.'s comment in Beals, supra note 25 at para. 132, "[tjhe implication
of the position of the majority is that Canadian defendants will from now on be obliged to participate
in foreign lawsuits no matter how meritless the claim or how small the amount of damages in issue
... on pain of potentially devastating consequences from which Canadian courts will be virtually
powerless to protect them." The sentiment is also echoed by Walker who states, "[tlherefore, it seems
that it is now incumbent on defendants to participate in any foreign proceedings commenced against
them to protect their rights regardless of the apparent size or merits of the claim." J. Walker, "Beals v
Sadanha: Striking the Comity Balance Anew" (2002) 5 Can. Intl. Law. 28 at 29 [Walker, "Striking the
Comity Balance"].
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of extending internationally principles that were specifically contemplated
for the domestic enforcement context. In Morguard,La Forest J. distinctly
emphasized the expansion of jurisdictional rules in accordance with the
principles of order and fairness that necessarily underlie a modem system
of private international law. The real and substantial connection test was
simply the means used by La Forest J. to arrive at a result which comported
with these twin principles. It is doubtful whether La Forest J. had in mind
requiring a Canadian defendant to defend an action in a foreign, unfamiliar
forum simply because of the possible existence of a real and substantial
connection, without regard to the defendant's ability to access that legal
system, the difficulty and burden of litigating there, and the potential
merits of the claim against him.
The facts of Beals perfectly illustrate the injustice that can be wreaked
by broadened enforcement rules that are not specifically calibrated to
respond to fairness issues arising from international litigation. In that case,
a nuisance action turned into a nightmare for two Canadian couples when
a Florida default judgment was held to be enforceable in an Ontario court.
The case involved a dispute over a piece of property in Florida originally
worth $8000 (U.S.) 'Nhich the American plaintiffs alleged was sold to them
by \\ay of misrepresentation. The Ontario defendants took certain steps to
defend the claim, NN
hich the trial judge in Ontario clearly considered to be of
dubious merit, but ultimately allowed a S260,000 (U.S.) judgment against
them to be issued in default. The defendants took no action to set aside
the Florida judgment. The plaintiffs instituted enforcement proceedings in
Ontario. and by the time the action came to trial, the judgment was worth
about S800,O00 (Cdn.), accounting for interest and the exchange rate.72 The
Supreme Court of Canada held that the defendants had brought themselves
within the jurisdictional embrace of the foreign court by entering into a
cross-border transaction, and were therefore expected to defend the action
in the United States. This is despite the fact that the defendants calculated
that it was not in their commercial interest to travel to Florida, hire foreign
counsel, and actively participate in foreign legal proceedings in respect of
property whose value was thought to be a mere $8000."3 Thus, the Beals
casc raises a scenario where the foreign court was a reasonable place for
the defendant to be sued, but the defendant nevertheless acted reasonably

72. \arl) '1M5%
of the av ard was for punitive damages and for lost profits in a business venture that
appcars iohave come to a siandstill torreasons unrelated to the alleged misrepresentation.
73. Walker queries, "ow, it might be wondered, would defendants who prudently determine that
the unreu s crable e\pensc of deknding an unmentorious claim w ould be greater than any reasonable
aNsard knoa that the\ must police the foreign proceedings themselves to avoid an unjustifiable and

highly disproportionate award?" Walker, "Striking the Comity Balance." supra note 71 at 29.
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in not defending the action there. The hoiguarn/,Icals rules do not at
present provide any mechanism for addressing this troublesome issue.
Another problematic feature of the common law rules stems from
the way that the Supreme Court unilaterall\ liberalized the Canadian
enforcement regime. It appears that the success of the Court's gambit,
measured in terms of economic benefit to Canada, is contingent upon other
countries taking notice of Canada's readiness to enforce foreign judgments
and responding in turn by eliminating barriers to the recognition of
Canadian judgments.7 4 Ho vex er, -many countries \ ith "xhich Canada has
significant trade relationships remain ... less willing to enforce Canadian
judgments than post-Mo uard Canada is to enforce theirs." 5 The
Morguard/Beals regime thus places Canadian litigants at a comparative
disadvantage in international disputes. Where a Canadian defendant
is faced with circumstances which could arguably constitute a real and
substantial connection with the foreign forum, the defendant is compelled
to defend the action abroad. Conversel\. where a Canadian plaintiffobtains
a remedy in an entirely appropriate forum, there is a distinct possibility
that it will not be enforced by a foreign court unless the judgment forum
assumed jurisdiction under one of the two traditional grounds.
Canada's recognition rules are even more generous than those of the
United States, for example, which is widely perceived as exceptionally
accommodating of foreign judgments. In the U.S., jurisdiction is only
properly assumed by a foreign court \here it had "minimum contacts"
with the defendant.7 6 The minimum contacts test is more stringent than
Canada's real and substantial connection test because it requires evidence
that the defendant purposely availed himself of the benefits of the forum
ithin the forum
state by acting in a way that would have some impact v%
state.- The real and substantial connection test, b\ contrast, only requires
a connection between the forum and the subject matter of the dispute more
broadly.
Walker warns that in enlarging the scope of the real and substantial
connection test, Canadian courts may be exceeding the demands of
international comity. She asserts that "It]he requirements of comity may
continue to be those endorsed ... in Morguard, but the circumstances in

74. V. Black, "Commodifying Justice for Global Free Trade: The Proposed Hague Judgments
Convention" (2000) 38 Osgoode Hall L. J. 237 at 250.
75. Ibid.
76.

International Shoe : Mashington. 326 U S. 310 (It)45) [International Shoe]; Ackermann v

Levine, 788 F.2d 830 (2d. Cir. 1986) (applying International Shoe principles to foreign judgments).
77. C.C. Chao & C.S. Neuhoff, "Enforcement and Recognition of Foreign Judgments in United
States Courts: A Practical Perspective" (2001-2002) 29 Pepperdine L. Rev. 147 at 156.
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which the balance must be struck have changed."78 Another Canadian
conflicts scholar makes similar observations:
On the international plane, however, it is asking a great deal to expect
the other nations of the world to enforce any Canadian default judgment
so long as the Canadian court has the minimum connection with the
litigation that Canadian law requires for the assertion of jurisdiction to
be constitutionally acceptable. By the same token, it is asking a lot of
Canadian courts to expect them to recognize default judgments from
anywhere else in the world so long as the foreign court had the same
minimum connection with the litigation that a Canadian court would
need to have for its jurisdiction to be constitutionally valid. It is simply
unrealistic to assume that the demands of comi., of order andfairness,
are the same across internationalboundaries as they are within our
lderation...(emphasis added). "

Comity, according to this view, does not require that borders be thrown
open to foreign judgments, without reference to the legitimate interests of
Canadian defendants.
VI. Alternative Common Law Tests for Enforcement
1. Introduction
It is clear that the enforcement regimes in England and in Canada both
reveal significant, albeit different, weaknesses. While the common law
rules in England are not sufficiently receptive to foreign judgments, the
rules in Canada may in fact be too receptive to judgments from abroad.
The appropriate common law solution, therefore, may be to find a "middle
ground," one which furthers the objectives of judgment recognition while
adequately addressing issues of fairness to the parties.
To determine where this middle ground should lie, it is essential to
identify the relevant principles which should guide the formulation of an
appropriate common law enforcement test. In isolating these principles,
one should bear in mind the deficiencies in each set of common law rules,
the goals of judgment enforcement, and the general objectives served by
the rules of private international law. Ideally, a common law enforcement
scheme should:
i) reveal a link between jurisdiction and enforcementii) be guided by requirements of fairness to both plaintiff and
defendant;
iii) promote, insofar as practicable, the objectives served by judgment
enforcement;
79. Walker, "Striking the Comity Balance,' supra note 71 at 30. See also J. Walker. "The Great
Canadian Comity Experiment Continues" (20(4) 120 L.Q.R. 365 [Walker, "Comity Experiment"].
79. J. Blom, "The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: MorguardGoes Forth Into the World" (1997)
28 Can. Bus. L. J. 373 at 392,
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iv)

boast the virtues of simplicity and case of application;

v) maintain an appropriate balance between certainty and flexibility;
vi) discourage selection of forum based on enforceability of the final
judgment;
vii) recognize the unique problems posed bN the enforcement of truly

foreign judgments.
The goal is to formulate a test which complies to the fullest extent possible
with all of these principles, without sacrificing one at the expense of the
other8 0
2. The Possible Tests
a. Natural Forum Test
It has been suggested by Briggs that an appropriate enforcement test in
England should depend upon whether the plaintiff can establish that the
foreign court was the "natural forum" for the prosecution of the action.
The natural forum is the one which has the most real and substantial
connections with the action, such that it is the appropriate forum for the
resolution of the dispute. The attractix eness of this test clearly lies in
the alignment of forum non conveniens principles with the rules for the
enforcement of judgments. thereby recognizing the correlation between
jurisdiction and enforcement. Moreover, the natural forum test promotes
the commercial, political and administrative efficiency objectives of
judgment enforcement to a far greater extent than the current common
law rules. Under the proposed test, a greater number ofjudgments would
be enforceable and judgment creditors would not encounter significant
enforcement obstacles in England, provided that the judgment was issued
in the natural forum.
However, the proposed test is subject to criticism on the basis that the
concept of a natural forum to which litigation necessarily belongs may be
an undesirable concept in itself. An international dispute is likely to have
relevant connections to various countries, and it is often arbitrary to pick
one jurisdiction as the natural forum. In other words, this test restricts the
plaintiff's choice of forum to what the enforcing court perceives to be the
natural forum, even though there may be real and substantial connections

80. Options not considered as viable possibilities for common law enforcement rules include: those
currently in place in England and Canada; allow ing a full revicw of the foreign judgment on grounds
of law and fact; not enforcing any foreign judgments; enforcing all foreign judgments; adopting a
reciprocity requirement; enforcing judgments only where the foreign court assumed jurisdiction
on a basis which the enforcing court recognizes for itself, and adopting a special test for individual
consumer litigation. On the latter test, see J. Ziegel, 'Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Canada,
Unlevel Playing Fields, and Beals v. Saldanha: A Consumer Perspective" (2003) 38 Can. Bus. L.J.

294.
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with other fora. In addition, the natural forum test is not a particularly
certain and predictable one unless all factors clearly point to one forum.
However, one commentator suggests that despite its vagueness, "[the
concept] has proved far from unworkable.""1
The more problematic element of the natural forum test relates to how
fairness concerns are addressed, if at all, under this test. As indicated,
Briggs' proposed test involves ascertaining which jurisdiction is the
natural forum for the resolution of a dispute; if the judgment was issued
in that forum, then it should be enforced in England. However, theforum
non conieniens analysis in England is in fact a two-stage inquiry, which

focuses partly on the natural forum, and partly on the plaintiff's legitimate
personal or juridical advantage that would be lost in having to litigate in
that most appropriate forum. "- It is possible under Spiliadaprinciples for an
English court to conclude that a foreign jurisdiction is the natural forum, but
nonetheless refuse to stay an action on the basis that the plaintiff is entitled
not to be deprived of the advantages of litigating in England. 83 Thus, the
following anomalous situation could result: Country A is determined to
be the natural forum. Country B, in which the litigation is initiated and
,which uses rules similar to England, concludes that although Country A
is indeed the natural forum, it will not stay its action so as to allow the
plaintiff his legitimate personal or juridical advantage. Country B issues a
judgment in favour of the plaintiff, which the plaintiff subsequently seeks
to enforce in England. Under Briggs' natural forum test, it appears that
the judgment would not be enforceable because Country A, not Country
B, was the forum with the most real and substantial connections to the
dispute. As is apparent, the second phase of the Spiliadainquiry, which is
specifically designed to deal with fairness concerns for the plaintiff, does
not translate well into the natural forum enforcement test.
It is equally unclear how considerations of fairness to the defendant
are dealt with under the natural forum test. Where the natural forum is a
distant and unfamiliar jurisdiction, is a defendant automatically expected
to defend there, simply on the basis that it is the so-called natural forum?
If this is the case, Briggs' natural forum test would be quite similar to the

81.

Hams, supra note 45 at 493.

92. Spihda Marat't Corporation v Cansulex Ltd. [19871 A.C. 460 (H.L.) [Spiliadal. The

Canadian Supreme Court has approved of the general thrust of Spiliada. although refusing to
specitically adopt a two-%tagc approach to forum non conveniens. See Amchem Products Inc. v.British
Colomiha (l'orker.s Compensation Board), [19931 1 S.C.R. 897 [Amcheml.
83. Scc Luhhc and others v Cape pc., [20001 4 All E.R. 268 (H.L.); Connelly v RTZ Corp. Pic.,
[19961 Q,1B. 361 (C.A.).
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real and substantial connection test put forth in Alnguard and Beals,"
Consider the following hypothetical:
Suppose a woman who immigrated to \ancouer from Taiwan five years
ago, to take up a neNN life after the failure of her business in Taipei,
is now sued in Taipei for a large sum that the plaintiff says she still
owes him out of the old business. She does not defend. The alleged
creditor gets judgment by default and sues on it in British Columbia.
The defendant says she had a good defence but is just getting a new
business off the ground in Vancouer and could not afford to defend
the action in Tai'man. E~ervthing related to the claim is connected
with Taiwan, so there can be no doubt about the real and substantial
connection with that jurisdiction. Does that mean the judgment should
be enforced, irrespective of perceived hardship to the defendant? None
of the reported cases mentioned involved a defendant who ... lacked the
means to defend the foreign lawsuit, much less a default judgment from
a distant foreign court and ... an unfamiliar foreign legal system.Y

It is clear that Taiwan is the natural forum for the resolution of this dispute.
Does this mean, though, that there should be no consideration of factors such
as difficulty to the defendant in litigating abroad and the likelihood that the
claim will succeed on the merits? " Under the natural forum test, as under
Morgard/Bealsprinciples, the defendant in the aforementioned example
would be expected to defend the foreign action or face the consequences
of an enforceable default judgment. The main weakness in the natural
forum test, like that of the Canadian real and substantial connection test,
lies in the fact that it does not provide adequate mechanisms to ensure
that fairness concerns arising from the cross-border nature of a dispute are
satisfactorily addressed.
b. Anti-suit Injunction Test
Some commentators17 have suggested that the test for the recognition of
foreign judgments should be akin to that for restraining proceedings abroad.
If the enforcing court would not have restrained the foreign proceedings by
way of anti-suit injunction, that court should enforce the resultantjudgment,
subject to any defences. In Soci&tt Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale

84. The difference obviously being that the latter remains a broader test because simply a real and
substantial connection suffices (the alternate forum does not have to be the one with the most real and
substantial connections to the dispute).
85. Blom, "Foreign Judgments," supra note 79 at 386.
86. Briggs would likely argue that, to the e'tent that these are relevant considerations, they should be
argued before the foreign court in aforum non conveniens (or similar) proceeding. He states, "[emore
important is to pause to consider whether such solicitude for the defendant is really the issue which
should dominate our thoughts." Briggs, "Which Foreign Judgments?", supra note 46 at 225.
87. See especially, Harris, supra note 45, and Reed, supra note 4.
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v. Lee Kid Jak the Privy Council established the current English legal
framework governing the availability of anti-suit injunctions to restrain
proceedings in a foreign court. An anti-suit injunction is available to
restrain foreign proceedings which are oppressive or vexatious where the
English court possesses in personam jurisdiction over the plaintiff to be
enjoined and where England is the natural forum for the resolution of the
dispute. In deciding whether to grant the injunction, the English court must
consider not only the injustice to the defendant if the plaintiff is allowed to
pursue the foreign proceedings, but also the injustice to the plaintiff if he
is not permitted to proceed in his choice forum.
Under the anti-suit injunction enforcement test, there is a presumption
that the foreign judgment is enforceable: the judgment debtor will seek to
displace this presumption by demonstrating that an English court would
have granted an anti-suit injunction to restrain the foreign proceedings. It
is thought that the advantage of this sort of test is that it presents a high
hurdle for a judgment debtor to overcome and thus will better promote the
free movement of judgments. "
The main problem with this test lies in its complexity when abstractly
superimposed on the English enforcement regime. It is inappropriate
for an enforcing court to determine retroactively, and with the benefit of
hindsight, whether another English court would have issued a discretionary
remedy - the anti-suit injunction - at an earlier, interlocutory stage in the
proceedings. The anti-suit injunction is designed to prevent a plaintiff
from continuing proceedings against a defendant in circumstances which
rongful conduct or which would lead to unjust consequences.
amount to NN
This is assessed at the time the action is proceeding in the foreign court.
It is highly artificial at the post-trial stage to inquire into what an English
court would have done at an earlier stage in those proceedings and with
more circumscribed knowledge. had that court been presented with an
application by the defendant to restrain foreign proceedings. This is
particularly so in light of the fact that in the majority of these cases, the
defendant will not have appeared at all in the original proceedings (i.e., the
judgment will have been given in default).
Furthermore, it is unclear how certain of the pre-requisites to the grant
of an anti-suit injunction apply in the enforcement context. Consider, for
instance, the following situation. A California court issues a judgment,
having assumed jurisdiction based on the defendant's temporary presence

XX, 114871 I A "71 [S/.NII The Supreme Court of Canada in A4mchem, supra note 82 also agreed
, th the approach of the English Court of Appeal to anti-suit injunctions in SNI, albeit with some
minor modifications.
X9. Reed, vupra note 4 at 27X
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in the territory. Japan Nvas, in the eves ofthe English court, the natural lbrum
for the trial of the action. Enforcement is sought in England in respect of
assets located there. England has no other connection with the dispute (i.e.,
it is not the natural forum, it does not possess in personam jurisdiction over
the plaintiff). Under the natural forum test described above, the judgment
would not be enforced in England since the defendant's presence within the
territory would not suffice to render California the natural forum. However,
it appears that under the proposed anti-suit injunction test, enforcement
would automatically be granted because England, neither possessing in
personam jurisdiction over the plaintiff, nor being the natural forum,
would have been incapable of issuing an anti-suit injunction under these
circumstances. In cases where an English court would not have granted an
anti-suit injunction, the test mandates that the judgment be enforced. It is
irrelevant, under the anti-suit injunction enforcement test, that the action
proceeded in an entirely inappropriate forum.
If a claimant commences an action abroad \Nhich is oppressive and
vexatious and England is the natural forum. such that England would be
competent to grant an anti-suit injunction, this may preclude enforcement
of the foreign judgment. If, on the other hand, a claimant initiates an
action abroad which is equally vexatious and oppressive, but England is
not the natural forum, English courts would be required to enforce that
judgment, subject to any defences. Under this analysis, the enforcement
inquiry is not properly grounded. The relevant question should be whether
jurisdiction is appropriately assumed in both cases, and not whether
England happens to possess in personanjurisdiction over the plaintiff to
be enjoined and be the natural forum for the resolution of the dispute. The
test lacks a principled and coherent foundation, premised on the integration
of jurisdiction and enforcement."'
c. .4Nuanced Motguard Test
LeBel J. in his dissenting opinion in Beals proposes that a variant of the
real and substantial connection test govern the question of whether a
foreign court should be regarded as jurisdictionally competent to issue a

90. Harris, supra note 45 at 478 argues that it is necessary to integrate the law on the enforcement
of foreign judgments more closely into the conflict of laws, but not necessarily into the jurisdictional
analysis.
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judgment.' Essentially, LeBel J. supports the continued application of the
real and substantial connection test developed in Morguardandits progeny,
but tailors its application in the international context to better reflect
the unique issues raised by the enforcement of truly foreign judgments.
The test would subsume into the jurisdictional inquiry the question of
whether it is fair to require a defendant to litigate in a foreign forum. The
judgment court will only be perceived as jurisdictionally competent when,
considering the totality of the circumstances and the additional burdens
imposed by international litigation, it is fair and reasonable to expect the
defendant to litigate the claim in the foreign jurisdiction. LeBel J.notes
that among the factors affecting the onerousness of defending in a foreign
forum are the difficulty and expense of travelling there and the juridical
disadvantage that the defendant max face as a result of differences between
legal systems. 2
LeBel J.'s recasting of the Aloguard test may represent the
aforementioned "imiddle path" which accords due weight to international
judgments wvithout sacrificing the interests of domestic defendants. The
test recognizes that enforceabilitv concerns are not the same domestically
as they are internationally. and that a test which is to promote the freer
moN ement of judgments must also exhibit minimum fairness safeguards.
Of the \arious tests described above and the current existing regimes,
this nuanced A.\oiuard test best addresses fairness issues which arise in
international litigation. This approach results in a generous enforcement
regime, thereby promoting the objectives served by judgment enforcement
generally, but does so in a principled and rational manner. The test is
also relativelh easy to apply: the court must simply ask itself whether

words in Beals, supra note 25 at paras. 182-83.
91. The modified test is best explained in LeBel J.'s
"The test
-should ensure that, considering the totality of the connections between the forum and all
aspects of the action, it isnot unlair to expect the defendant to litigate in that forum. It does not follow
that there necessarilN has to be a connection between the defendant and the forum. There aresituations
where. gi%en the other connections between the forum and the proceeding, it is a reasonable place for
be expected to go there e\en though he personally
the action to be heard and the defendant can fairl.
ha, no link at all to that jurisdiction. . \ Ihen a court is as.ked to recognize and enforce a foreign
judgment, and questions whether the originating court's jurisdiction was properly restrained, it should
inquire into the connections betw cen the forum and all aspects of the action, on the one hand, and the
hardship that litigation in the loreign forum would impose on the defendant, on the other. The question
is hmi real and how suhstantial a tomnccton has to be to support the conclusion that the originating
court ii o a reasonable place tor the action to bc heard The answer is that the connection must be
strointii ,,'nigh to make t rasonahle.for the dh'ndant to be expected to litigate there even though
that may cntail additional erpense, in onivincni'e and risk. If litigating in the foreign jurisdiction
is venv huriah,,cnn to the dle ndant, a stronger degree of connection would be required before the
ori inatingcourt "assumption of jurivdiction should be recognized as fair and appropriate (emphasis
added ."

92. Beal/, sipra note 25 a para. 176.
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the foreign court had a sufficientlN real and substantial connection to the
dispute such that it was fair to expect a defendant to litigate there.
That is not to say, however, that the test is without its limitations.
Foremost among these is the open-textured and discretionary nature of the
judgment enlorcement inquiry. One commentator notes:
Decisions will turn, not so much on the X court's leeitimate jurisdiction,
as on the perceived justice or otherwise of holding a particular judgment
of the X court binding on matters ot'the judgment debtor. Ifpredictability
is something to matters in this context, such a broadening of the issue is
not necessarily to be welcomed.'"
At least under the traditional English rules - outmoded as they may be both parties "'know \where the\ stand" in terms of whether a final judgment
%N
ill be enforceable. The necessar\ implications of the nuanced ,It-uwtlrd
analysis, or an\ other sort of discretionary. fairness-based, or substantial
connections test, are two-fold. First. the successful plaintiff cannot know
whether a judgment will be enforceable until he actually seeks to enforce
it. It will be the enforcing court that determines whether the defendant
acted reasonably in not seeking to defend a foreign default judgment, and
thereby whether the judgment ought to be enforced. Second, the prospective
defendant is placed in the unenviable position of having to predict whether
a final judgment \-ill be enforceable, based both on objective connections
(locus of tort, business activity in foreign jurisdiction, etc.). as well as
subjecti\e considerations (personal finances. difficulty/hardship in
travelling, etc.). The defendant seeking advice on whether to defend the
foreign action will be told, in all but the clearest of cases, that it would be
preferable for him to defend. and thereby submit to the jurisdiction of the
foreign court, rather than run the risk of an enforceable default judgment.
It should be pointed out that these limitations are not unique to LeBel
J.'s recalibrated .. orguardtest. The nuanced .MIi-gnardtest is likely only
marginally more uncertain than, for example, the current 11oiguardtest or
aproposed natural forum or anti-suit injunction test. Ifthere is to be a move
away from rigid common law rules of private international law - as has
occurred with jurisdiction and choice of law - this will inevitably require
sacrificing some degree of predictability. The uncertainty engendered by
a new type of test (both for plaintiff and defendant) may be the necessary
price to pay for a common law regime which is acutely responsive to the

93. Blom, "Foreign Judgments," supra note 79 at p. 378. See also Reed, supra note 4 at 276 (-The
is in leaving 'order and fairness' to a solipsistic, case-by-case exaluation. It smacks of
difficulty ...
ad-hoceiv.").
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order and fairness issues central to the enforcement of "truly foreign"
judgments.' 4
Though perhaps obvious from the foregoing analysis, one final point
should be explicitly made: the fact that an entirely appropriate common
la~v enforcement model remains elusive suggests that this is an area that
may be in need of legislative reform. A carefully drafted statute can fill in
the blanks where a broad judicial rule cannot. It can clearly identify and
define the circumstances where a foreign judgment will be enforceable
(e.g.. where the tort was committed in the foreign jurisdiction, where the
defendant carries on business activity in the foreign jurisdiction, etc.),
allowing both parties to organize their affairs accordingly. In addition to
enumerating the circumstances in which a foreign court will be perceived
as jurisdictionally competent, legislation can contain provisions for
exceptional cases (such as Beals, for instance), where the interests of
justice may militate against enforcing a judgment. Thus, although this
article has focused on how the common law can best be ameliorated, it is
quite possible that the solution lies not in improving, but in abandoning
the common law."
VII. RevisitiW the Defences
In both England and Canada, the defences currently occupy a very limited
role in the enforcement regime. One commentator notes that "the success
rate of defendants relying on the common law defences is very low generally
and Nirtually negligible in the Canadian context."'' " A restrictive test for
the defences may be appropriate where, as in England, the jurisdiction
test is a difficult threshold for a plaintiff seeking recognition to satisfy.
In such circumstances, where the defendant has either consented to the
jurisdiction of the foreign court or is present in the foreign territory, the
potential for unfairness is minimal. It is significantly magnified, however,
where the jurisdictional inquiry is broadened, such as in Morguard and
Beals. In such cases, the defences should be tailored to better complement
a liberal enforcement regime. Speaking specifically of the Canadian
context, Castel and Walker comment:
94 See Goodman & Talpis. supra note 19 at 224 ("Of course, added flexibility may also lead to
dillicult) in anticipating the results of the court's enquiry in any given fact situation, but, as in so many
other areas of the law, a degree of uncertainty may be seen as an appropriate trade-off for enhanced
flexibility.").
015. See Walker, "Comity FExperiment," supra note 79 at 369 ("...statutory reform even in the form
of the most rudimentary safeguards ... \ ould provide welcome assistance under the circumstances").
See, as an example of statutory initiati c, the uniform statute for the enforcement of foreign judgments
adopted hy the Uniform Law Conference of Canada in 2003, available at <http://www.ulc.ca/en/us
index k Iam'see= 1&sub = let >.

96.
at 41

E Edinger, "*'lh.muardi, De Savoyc: Subsequent Developments" (1993) 22 Can. Bus. L. 3.29
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[It wvould seem necessar-] to revise the defences . so as to protect
persons ... who ha e been sued in foreign courts from particular kinds
of unfairness that can arise in cross-border litigation, and so as to prevent
abuse from occurring as a result of liberal rules for the enforcement of
judgments."r

In short, modified defences are a necessary corollary of liberalized
enforcement rules.
The relevant question is how can the defences be revised to provide
additional safeguards to defendants who may be unfairly "caught" by
broadened enforcement rules, while ensuring that the exceptions do not
swallow the rule whole? The Beals case suggests a couple of ways that
the defences can be re-cast in order to provide meaningful protection for
domestic defendants. First, the actual defences themselves, particularly
the defence of natural justice, can be interpreted in a more purposive
and flexible manner. The three dissenting judges in Beals held that the
Florida default judgment violated natural justice because the Canadian
defendants had not been duly apprised of the nature and extent of the
financial jeopardy that they faced in the foreign proceedings. According
to this view, to satisty natural justice requirements, a court must inquire
into whether the defendants in a particular proceeding were sufficiently
informed of the case to meet to allow them the opportunity to reasonably
determine whether or not to participate in the foreign action."5
As discussed, England and Canada have adopted different
approaches to the fraud defence. Canada's position appears to strike
a reasonable balance between what can be considered two equally
unpalatable alternatives: admitting any and all evidence that a foreign
court Nvas deliberately misled (whether or not such evidence was presented
to the foreign court), or refusing to admit any evidence of fraud, unless
such fraud consisted of the foreign court having been misled into assuming
jurisdiction. As ageneral proposition. the fraud defence should be construed
quite narrowly, but with some flexibility to allow effective protection for
domestic defendants. Default judgments emanating from foreign legal
97. J.G. Castel & J. Walker, Canadian Conflict of Laws, 5th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 2002) at
14-27. See also Briggs, "Crossing the River," supra note 17 at 14-15 ("It would be curious to say that
one may develop a new basis of jurisdictional recognition %%
ithout regard to the defences which will
condition its application in practice. These defences. %%hich have remained surprisingly constant, all
date from a century ago ... The defences were, as a matter of historical fact, developed alongside
the traditional rules of jurisdiction under the common law. They were not developed in cases where
a basis of jurisdictional competence %%as a real and substantial connection "1. But see S. Pitel,
"Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Where Morguard Stands After Beals," (2004) 40 Can. Bus. L. J.
189 at 214 ("Expanding the situations in which our courts will recognize foreign judgments does not
necessarily require aparallel expansion of the defences.").
98. Beals, supra note 25 at para. 91.
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regimes, however, must be approached with additional caution. It may be,
as suggested by LeBel J. in Beals, that a broader fraud test should apply in
cases vhere the defendant's decision not to participate in the proceedings
giving rise to a foreign default judgment was a demonstrably reasonable
one." Although the Canadian position on fraud represents a sensible
compromise between the competing interests of fairness and finality, the
rule should be relaxed as necessary to respond to dangers arising from the
enforcement of foreign default judgments.
It has been suggested that the final defence, public policy, should be
interpreted in a manner which renders unenforceable, in whole or in part,
substantial punitive damages avards. Although courts have held that it
is not counter to public policy to enforce an award for punitive damages,
it is arguably contrary to public policy to enforce awards that are grossly
disproportionate to the defendant's behaviour or awards which are made
without reference to the defendant's moral blameworthiness. Not only
does precedent exist for such an approach, but the practice of reviewing
excessive damages a\\ards and enforcing foreign awards only to the
extent that similar or comparable damages would have been awarded by
the enforcing court appears to be consistent with accepted international
standards of comitv.t "' For instance, Section 33 of the Preliminary
Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters' provides that a court called upon to enforce an
azard of non-compensatory damages may limit enforcement to a lesser
amount if the aw ard is "grossi excessive." In addition, several countries,
notabl\ Germany and Japan, have used the public policy defence to
refuse entorcement of exorbitant punitive damages awards from foreign
jurisdictions."2
Not all commentators support using the public policy exception to limit
the enforcement of foreign punitive awards. Blom, for example, hopes
that courts \ill resist the temptation to invoke the public policy defence
to deal with the issue of large punitive damages. In his view, problems

' . LeBel J. asserts in Beal, supra note 25 at para. 234. "If the defendant ignored \hat it justifiably
considered to he a tri\ ial or meritless claim, and can prove on the cis il standard that the plaintiff
took ad\ antage of his absence to perpetrate a deliberate deception on the foreign court, it would be
inappropriate to insist that a Canadian court asked to enforce the resulting judgment must turn a blind
eye to those facts ... [A] more generous \ ersion of the fraud defence ought to be available, as required,
to address the dangers of abuse associated \with the loosening of the jurisdiction test to admit a broad
catcgorx of ioranirly unenforceable default judgments."
100 \\alker, '"Striking the ('omity Balance," supra note 71 at 33.
101 ',pccial Commission ol'thc Hague Conference on Private International Law, adopted in October
1999, re\ acid June 2001. Available at <\\ ww.hcch.net/e/con\ cntions/ draft36e.html>.
102 R \ Brand, "Punitise Damages and the Recognition of Judgments"(1996) 43 Netherlands Int'l
I. Re\ 143 at 13- ,X.
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arising from the enforcement of disproportionate punitive damages awards
do not raise questions of fundamental morality, which is intended to be
the touchstone of the public policy defence.t"3 LeBel J.in Beals agreed
that the public policy defence should not be expanded simply to address
concerns stemming from excessive puniti e awards:
[T]he better approach is to continue to reser e the public policy defence
for cases where the objection is to the law of the foreign forum, rather
than the wvay the law was applied, or the size of the aw ardper w. In other

words, the defence should continue to be ... 'directed at the concept of
repugnant lamvs, not repugnant facts."0 4
According to LeBel J., the doctrine of public policy has long been aimed at
condemning a foreign jurisdiction's law. To expand the rule to situations
where there is nothing inherently offensive about the foreign law, but
where the objection lies in the way the law NA
as applied, could undermine
norms of international cooperation and respect. 5
An alternative solution, one Nhich may allay the concerns of critics
wvho are circumspect about attributing a broader meaning to the public
policy doctrine, would be to create a residual defence to address concerns
arising from judgments which are not caught by any of the traditional
defences. The defence would preclude recognition of a foreign judgment
in circumstances where the enforcement of the judgment would shock the
conscience of the public and cast a negative light on the justice system." 6
In the final analysis, Briggs convincingly argues, there is "no particular
need for embarrassment if a court tells a plaintiff that he may enforce his
judgment anywhere he pleases, but if he -wantsto do so by means of a local
judicial order, it must come within touching distance of local standards of
propriety."'0 7 He elaborates:

103. J.Blom, supra note 79 at 400
104. Beals, supra note 25 at para. 221.
105. Beals, supra note 25 at para. 221. He acknow ledges, ho, e\er, that where foreign laws violate
the basic tenets of fundamental justice (e.g., where punitive damages are aNsarded absent fault or
morally blameworthy behaviour on the part of the defendant), courts should have the discretion to
deny or limit enforcement of the judgment.
106. This is the test used b) LeBel J.in Beals, and is explained by the trial
judge in Beals (1998) 42
O.R.(3d) 127, --it may be that a corollary of the public policy, which was set out in Morguard, and the
broadening of the recognition rules for foreign judgments, is that Canadian courts w%
ill, of necessity,
have to develop some sort ofjudicial sniff test in considering foreign judgments. In cases where fraud
does not reach the level required for the defence of fraud, but is nevertheless egregious and where
other matters do not engage either the traditional public policy of lack of natural justice defences, but
are nevertheless egregious, the totality of circumstances may argue against enforcement."
107. Briggs, "Crossing the River." supra note 17 at1 .
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It would be an extraordinary proposition to argue that a plaintiff may
excuse or justify his operating at a lo %er standard of good faith or
procedural propriety, or may subject the defendant to a lower and therefore
unequal degree of protection, by the strategum of taking proceedings
first in a court where the playing field is not level, and then inviting a
receiving court to find that the foreign court had done 'minimum justice',
hinting at the meretricious and menacing point that if the receiving court
goes farther than this it is offending the requirements of comity by
disrespecting the foreign court. True, it may be unhelpful to regard this
as a matter of public policy. It is preferable to be open about it, and to
acknowxledge the right of the receiving court to review before approving
a judgment which, hoivever one chooses to convey it, risks leaving a
fish-like smell in the nostrils and a nastN taste in the mouth. 8
Conclusion
In both England and Canada, the common law rules on the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments are in serious need of reconsideration.
The English approach, while offering considerable protection to domestic
defendants, is outdated and does little to promote the objectives underpinning
judgment enforcement. The Canadian position, by contrast, fully advances
such objecti\es, but lea'ves Canadian defendants virtually unprotected
from the landmines of international litigation. A potential solution would
be to adopt a variant of the Moiguai real and substantial connection test,
such that questions of how fair it is to require a domestic defendant to
litigate in a foreign forum are incorporated into the jurisdictional analysis
itself. The modified fot-guard test would be customized to respond to the
specific fairness concerns raised in international litigation. This would be
a far more liberal paradigm than that which currently exists in England. It
\Nould also represent a tailored version of the rules that apply at present in
Canada. Defences to enforcement, wxhich are interpreted in a flexible and
purposive manner, would accompany this enforcement framework.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of Canada missed an excellent
opportunity in Beals to reassess the Mfoiguard rules in an international
light. Only time will tell whether the real and substantial connection
test w\hich applies inter-provincially will cause problems when put into
operation internationally. Beals itself suggests that the test can cause
noteworthy problems, even in a relatively familiar legal jurisdiction such
as Florida.
Inglish courts, unencumbered by recent precedent, can consider
the various possibilities afresh before embarking on the challenge of
relormulating the common law rules. The Canadian experience provides

109.

Brigg,, "(rossing the River," supra note 17 at 19.
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hether any of this
to consider NN
an ideal "'opportunit. for English lawyers ...
new foreign material, judicially road-tested as some of it has been, offers
a principled and practical improvement on the lamv so far established. "' 0 9
However, in re-e\aluating the common law rules, English courts would
be vise to heed the warning of LeBel J. in Beals: *'[i]n our enthusiasm to
advance beyond the parochialism of the past, \,e must be careful not to
overshoot this goal.""'
What is known at present is that there is a pressing need for reform of
the common law enforcement rules on both sides of the Atlantic. What is
not known is \ hen this \\ill occur, or what shape it \\ill take.

109. Briggs, "Crossing the River," supra note 17 at 1.
10. Beals, supranote 25 at para. 173.

